International (RTCA, United States; EUROCAE, Europe); recognised by FAA AC 20-152A (7 October 2022) and the EASA equivalent

DO-254 / ED-80

93 controls. 3 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

Page built . This page is derived from the framework corpus, which changes when the corpus is extended rather than daily.

93 controls 3 frameworks share controls with it International (RTCA, United States; EUROCAE, Europe); recognised by FAA AC 20-152A (7 October 2022) and the EASA equivalent verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
11 Introduction, purpose, scope and use0
1.61.6 Complexity considerations1
1.71.7 Alternative methods or processes0
1010 Hardware design life cycle data: characteristics0
10.1.110.1.1 Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification (PHAC)2
10.1.210.1.2 Hardware design plan0
10.1.310.1.3 Hardware validation plan1
10.1.410.1.4 Hardware verification plan2
10.1.510.1.5 Hardware configuration management plan0
10.1.610.1.6 Hardware process assurance plan1
10.210.2 Hardware design standards and guidance2
10.3.110.3.1 Hardware requirements0
10.3.2.110.3.2.1 Conceptual design data0
10.3.2.210.3.2.2 Detailed design data0
10.4.110.4.1 Traceability data2
10.4.210.4.2 Review and analysis procedures0
10.4.310.4.3 Review and analysis results0
10.4.410.4.4 Test procedures0
10.4.510.4.5 Test results1
10.510.5 Hardware acceptance test criteria0
10.610.6 Problem reports0
10.710.7 Hardware configuration management records1
10.810.8 Hardware process assurance records1
10.910.9 Hardware Accomplishment Summary1
11.1.111.1.1 Modifications to previously developed hardware2
11.1.211.1.2 Change of aircraft installation1
11.1.311.1.3 Change of application or design environment0
11.1.411.1.4 Upgrading a design baseline1
11.1.511.1.5 Additional configuration management considerations0
11.2.111.2.1 Electronic component management for COTS components1
11.2.211.2.2 COTS component procurement1
11.3.111.3.1 Product service experience data acceptability criteria1
11.3.211.3.2 Assessment of product service experience data1
11.3.311.3.3 Product service experience assessment data0
11.4.111.4.1 Tool assessment and qualification process2
11.4.211.4.2 Tool assessment and qualification data1
2.1.12.1.1 Information flow from the system process to the hardware design life cycle1
2.1.22.1.2 Information flow from the hardware design life cycle to the system process2
2.1.32.1.3 Information flow between the hardware and software life cycles1
2.22.2 System safety assessment processes1
2.3.12.3.1 Hardware safety assessment considerations1
2.3.22.3.2 Quantitative assessment of random hardware faults0
2.3.32.3.3 Qualitative assessment of hardware design errors and upsets0
2.3.42.3.4 Design assurance considerations for hardware failure condition classification1
33 Hardware design life cycle (overview)0
3.23.2 Transition criteria2
4.14.1 Planning process objectives2
4.24.2 Planning process activities2
55 Hardware design processes: design representation0
5.1.15.1.1 Requirements capture objectives2
5.1.25.1.2 Requirements capture activities3
5.2.15.2.1 Conceptual design objectives0
5.2.25.2.2 Conceptual design activities1
5.3.15.3.1 Detailed design objectives0
5.3.25.3.2 Detailed design process activities2
5.4.15.4.1 Implementation objectives0
5.4.25.4.2 Implementation activities1
5.5.15.5.1 Production transition objectives0
5.5.25.5.2 Production transition activities0
5.65.6 Acceptance test0
5.75.7 Series production (outside scope)0
6.1.16.1.1 Validation process objectives1
6.1.26.1.2 Validation process activities3
6.2.16.2.1 Verification process objectives2
6.2.26.2.2 Verification process activities3
6.3.16.3.1 Test1
6.3.26.3.2 Analysis1
6.3.36.3.3 Reviews0
6.3.3.16.3.3.1 Requirements review2
6.3.3.26.3.3.2 Design review2
7.17.1 Configuration management objectives2
7.2.17.2.1 Configuration identification1
7.2.27.2.2 Baseline establishment1
7.2.37.2.3 Problem reporting, tracking and corrective action1
7.2.47.2.4 Change control2
7.2.57.2.5 Release, archive and retrieve1
7.37.3 Data control categories1
8.18.1 Process assurance objectives2
8.28.2 Process assurance activities2
9.19.1 Means of compliance and planning2
9.29.2 Compliance substantiation1
AAppendix A Modulation of life cycle data by design assurance level, and verification independence2
B-2.1Appendix B 2.1 Functional failure path analysis method0
B-2.2Appendix B 2.2 Functional failure path analysis data0
B-3.1.1Appendix B 3.1.1 Architectural mitigation method1
B-3.1.2Appendix B 3.1.2 Architectural mitigation resolution0
B-3.1.3Appendix B 3.1.3 Architectural mitigation data0
B-3.2Appendix B 3.2 Product service experience (Level A and B)0
B-3.3.1Appendix B 3.3.1 Elemental analysis2
B-3.3.2Appendix B 3.3.2 Safety-specific analysis1
B-3.3.3Appendix B 3.3.3 Formal methods0
C-DAppendices C and D: glossary and acronyms0
DOCUMENTRTCA DO-254 / EUROCAE ED-80: the document and its status0

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What this page is

A control-level reference for DO-254 / ED-80, drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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