International (SAE S-18 with EUROCAE WG-63); used for type certification under 14 CFR and EASA CS

SAE ARP4754B / ED-79B

89 controls. 2 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

Page built . This page is derived from the framework corpus, which changes when the corpus is extended rather than daily.

89 controls 2 frameworks share controls with it International (SAE S-18 with EUROCAE WG-63); used for type certification under 14 CFR and EASA CS verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
3.13.1 Development assurance planning process and planning elements2
3.23.2 Development assurance plan1
3.2.13.2.1 Design description0
3.2.23.2.2 Transition criteria2
3.2.33.2.3 Deviations from plans1
3.33.3 Certification Authority coordination2
4.24.2 Aircraft function and requirement development0
4.34.3 Development of aircraft architecture and allocation of aircraft functions to systems0
4.44.4 Development of system functions and requirements0
4.54.5 Development of system architecture and allocation of system requirements to items1
4.6.1.14.6.1.1 Information flow from the system process to the item processes1
4.6.1.24.6.1.2 Information flow from the item processes to the system process2
4.6.1.34.6.1.3 Information flow between hardware and software life cycle processes1
4.6.24.6.2 Item design and build2
4.6.34.6.3 Item integration and verification2
4.6.44.6.4 Aircraft and system integration and verification, including unintended behaviors1
4.74.7 Summary of development assurance process outputs2
5.15.1 Safety assessment process1
5.1.15.1.1 Aircraft functional hazard assessment0
5.1.25.1.2 Preliminary aircraft safety assessment0
5.1.35.1.3 System functional hazard assessment0
5.1.45.1.4 Preliminary system safety assessment1
5.1.55.1.5 System safety assessment0
5.1.65.1.6 Aircraft safety assessment0
5.1.75.1.7 Safety program plan0
5.1.85.1.8 Safety-related flight operations or maintenance tasks0
5.1.95.1.9 Relationship with in-service safety0
5.2.15.2.1 General principles of development assurance level assignment1
5.2.25.2.2 FDAL and IDAL1
5.2.35.2.3 Detailed FDAL and IDAL assignment0
5.2.3.25.2.3.2 FDAL assignment with architecture consideration and functional failure sets0
5.2.3.2.15.2.3.2.1 Independence attributes1
5.2.3.2.25.2.3.2.2 FDAL and IDAL assignment process0
5.35.3 Requirements capture planning and modeling2
5.3.15.3.1 Classes of requirements0
5.3.1.15.3.1.1 Safety requirements1
5.3.1.105.3.1.10 Derived requirements2
5.3.1.115.3.1.11 Reuse of systems, equipment or items from previously certificated products1
5.3.1.25.3.1.2 Functional requirements0
5.3.1.35.3.1.3 Customer requirements0
5.3.1.45.3.1.4 Operational requirements0
5.3.1.55.3.1.5 Performance requirements0
5.3.1.65.3.1.6 Physical and installation requirements0
5.3.1.75.3.1.7 Maintainability requirements0
5.3.1.85.3.1.8 Interface requirements1
5.3.1.95.3.1.9 Certification requirements0
5.3.25.3.2 Capturing safety requirements from the safety analyses0
5.3.35.3.3 Identifying and evaluating derived requirements2
5.3.45.3.4 Capturing maintenance requirements for in-service use0
5.45.4 Requirements validation1
5.4.15.4.1 Validation process objectives1
5.4.25.4.2 Validation process and validation plan1
5.4.2.35.4.2.3 Correctness and completeness1
5.4.2.45.4.2.4 Management of assumptions0
5.4.2.55.4.2.5 Validation matrix1
5.4.2.65.4.2.6 Validation summary1
5.4.35.4.3 Correctness checks1
5.4.45.4.4 Completeness checks1
5.4.55.4.5 Validation approach0
5.4.65.4.6 Validation methods1
5.4.75.4.7 Validation data1
5.55.5 Implementation verification0
5.5.15.5.1 Verification process objectives1
5.5.25.5.2 Verification process1
5.5.35.5.3 Verification approach0
5.5.45.5.4 Verification planning1
5.5.55.5.5 Verification methods1
5.5.65.5.6 Verification data2
5.65.6 Configuration management0
5.6.15.6.1 Configuration management process objectives2
5.6.25.6.2 Configuration management process activities2
5.6.35.6.3 Configuration management data1
5.6.45.6.4 System control categories1
5.75.7 Process assurance0
5.7.15.7.1 Process assurance objectives2
5.7.25.7.2 Process assurance plan1
5.7.35.7.3 Process assurance reviews1
5.7.45.7.4 Process assurance data1
66 Modifications to aircraft or systems0
6.16.1 Modification and reuse process overview1
6.26.2 Modification management process0
6.36.3 Modification impact analysis1
6.46.4 Reuse of evidence from previous certification0
6.4.16.4.1 Use of service history1
A.1A.1 Process objectives, outputs and applicability by development assurance level1
SEC4INTRO4 and 4.1 Generic development process and development assurance concepts0
STANDARDSAE ARP4754B: the recommended practice and its scope0
STATUSStatus: Revision B is current; regulators recognize the A edition by advisory circular0
TERMS2.2 Definitions used by the requirements leaves0

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What this page is

A control-level reference for SAE ARP4754B / ED-79B, drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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