11 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 11 controls across our corpus
German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG) Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Role inventory + RACI
- Metrics + management review
- Annual cycle documentation
- Role inventory + RACI + DPO designation
- Operational controls + tooling investment
- Reporting process + content index
What closing it also buys you
The 14 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
BSI IT-Grundschutz7
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 53
API 11646
FedRAMP High2
FedRAMP Moderate2
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management18
FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (CAT)1
ISO/IEC 27557:20229
FFIEC IT Examination Handbook1
ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents18
NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5.1 HIGH1
SASB Standards8
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 7.8% | 14 of 180 |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 3.4% | 11 of 320 |
| API 1164 United States (API; referenced by the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines and used internationally) | 6.7% | 11 of 163 |
| FedRAMP High United States | 2.0% | 8 of 410 |
| FedRAMP Moderate United States | 2.5% | 8 of 323 |
| APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management Australia | 18.6% | 8 of 43 |
| FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (CAT) United States (FFIEC member agencies; voluntary self-assessment for financial institutions) | 1.3% | 8 of 595 |
| ISO/IEC 27557:2022 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 9.1% | 7 of 77 |
| FFIEC IT Examination Handbook United States (FRB, FDIC, NCUA, OCC and state banking supervisors) | 1.3% | 7 of 538 |
| ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Australia | 18.9% | 7 of 37 |
| NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5.1 HIGH United States | 1.9% | 6 of 317 |
| SASB Standards International | 8.7% | 6 of 69 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
All failure modes ยท
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