Named by 5 frameworks

POAM items past due without justification or risk acceptance

5 of the 723 frameworks in our corpus warn about this same failure, across 20 separate controls. That convergence is the measurement: it is not one standard's opinion.

Data measured , page built 22 September 2026 at 16:18 UTC.

5 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 20 controls across our corpus

FedRAMP High Evidence & Implementation Kit

This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.

See what is in it, $249

The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.

Who warns about it

Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.

What an auditor asks for

The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.

What closing it also buys you

The 4 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that does not.

Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.17
PCI DSS 4.04
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.09
ISO 27001:20228
C5 (Germany)5
CFTC System Safeguards (17 CFR 37, 38, 39, 49)17
CIS Controls v84
APRA CPS 23425
ISO/IEC 42001:20237
ISO 22301:201910
SOC 29
DORA19

Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred percent. Exact figures below.

Also progressesCovered Controls reached
Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.1
International
7.1%14 of 197
PCI DSS 4.0
International
4.8%12 of 249
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
United States
9.4%10 of 106
ISO 27001:2022
International
8.0%8 of 100
C5 (Germany)
Germany
5.8%7 of 121
CFTC System Safeguards (17 CFR 37, 38, 39, 49)
United States (CFTC)
17.9%7 of 39
CIS Controls v8
International
4.6%7 of 153
APRA CPS 234
Australia
25.0%6 of 24
ISO/IEC 42001:2023
International
7.2%6 of 83
ISO 22301:2019
International
10.5%6 of 57
SOC 2
United States
9.8%6 of 61
DORA
European Union
19.2%5 of 26

Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already touched.

Where this comes from

Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across every framework that names it.

The overlap is computed by traversing 332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control by control against source documents.

Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top is a count of frameworks.

Where this goes next

  1. The other failures the whole industry independently agrees on:The full catalogue →
  2. Everything else FedRAMP High asks for, and what it overlaps with:FedRAMP High in full →
  3. Which companies are disclosing the events this failure produces:Who disclosed it →
  4. What changed in those disclosures this week:What changed →
  5. And today's story, which is usually one of these arriving in public:Today's edition →

All failure modes ยท The index