5 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 5 controls across our corpus
Saudi PDPL Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- incident response plan
- playbooks
- incident log
- post-incident reviews
- Encryption + pseudonymisation evidence
- Processor contracts (Article 39 compliant)
What closing it also buys you
The 2 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
ISO/SAE 214343
ISO/IEC 27043:20157
NIST SP 800-124 Revision 214
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.014
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)7
BSI IT-Grundschutz2
Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data (UAE PDPL)25
EASA Part-IS4
APPI10
ISO 22320:20183
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| ISO/SAE 21434 International (ISO/TC 22/SC 32 with SAE International) | 3.8% | 7 of 183 |
| ISO/IEC 27043:2015 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 7.0% | 7 of 100 |
| NIST SP 800-124 Revision 2 United States | 14.7% | 5 of 34 |
| CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.0 United States | 14.3% | 5 of 35 |
| FFIEC IT Examination Handbook United States (FRB, FDIC, NCUA, OCC and state banking supervisors) | 0.7% | 4 of 538 |
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 7.1% | 4 of 56 |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 2.2% | 4 of 180 |
| Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data (UAE PDPL) United Arab Emirates | 25.0% | 3 of 12 |
| EASA Part-IS European Union (EASA Member States) | 4.1% | 3 of 74 |
| APPI Japan | 10.0% | 3 of 30 |
| IEC 62443 International (IEC TC 65/WG 10 with ISA99); adopted as EN IEC 62443 | 0.8% | 3 of 399 |
| ISO 22320:2018 International (ISO/TC 292); adopted as BS ISO, DIN ISO, SS ISO (Singapore, 2022), SSB ISO, GTC ISO (Panama) and GB/T (China) | 3.3% | 3 of 92 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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