4 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 4 controls across our corpus
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Encryption + pseudonymisation evidence
- Data subject breach notification when high-risk
- Incident response playbook
- Processor contracts (Article 26 compliant)
- DSS breach notification log + 72-hour evidence
- Affected data subject notification
What closing it also buys you
The 4 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)16
APPI26
Bahrain PDPL27
BSI IT-Grundschutz3
Jamaica Data Protection Act 202041
ISO/SAE 214343
ISO/IEC 27043:20157
API 11643
Ghana Cybersecurity Act50
IEC 624431
ISO/IEC 27019:20249
Indonesia PDP Law50
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 16.1% | 9 of 56 |
| APPI Japan | 26.7% | 8 of 30 |
| Bahrain PDPL Bahrain | 27.6% | 8 of 29 |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 3.9% | 7 of 180 |
| Jamaica Data Protection Act 2020 Jamaica | 41.2% | 7 of 17 |
| ISO/SAE 21434 International (ISO/TC 22/SC 32 with SAE International) | 3.8% | 7 of 183 |
| ISO/IEC 27043:2015 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 7.0% | 7 of 100 |
| API 1164 United States (API; referenced by the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines and used internationally) | 3.7% | 6 of 163 |
| Ghana Cybersecurity Act Ghana | 50.0% | 6 of 12 |
| IEC 62443 International (IEC TC 65/WG 10 with ISA99); adopted as EN IEC 62443 | 1.5% | 6 of 399 |
| ISO/IEC 27019:2024 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 9.0% | 6 of 67 |
| Indonesia PDP Law Indonesia | 50.0% | 5 of 10 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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