5 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 5 controls across our corpus
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Phishing simulation results
- Annual training records
- Vendor risk assessment library (SIG/CAIQ)
- Cloud provider Cloud First classification
- SBOM for OSS
- OT/ICS security architecture (IEC 62443)
What closing it also buys you
The 5 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
Nevada Gaming Control Board Cybersecurity Requirements87
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)10
ISO 27799:20253
ISO 1348520
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (FIPS 203, 204, 205)50
ISO/SAE 214342
ISO/IEC 27011:20244
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.011
ISO 270188
ISO/IEC 27043:20154
Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data (UAE PDPL)25
Privacy Act 1988 (Australia)37
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| Nevada Gaming Control Board Cybersecurity Requirements United States — Nevada | 87.5% | 7 of 8 |
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 10.7% | 6 of 56 |
| ISO 27799:2025 International (ISO/TC 215) | 3.8% | 5 of 130 |
| ISO 13485 International | 20.8% | 5 of 24 |
| NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (FIPS 203, 204, 205) United States (NIST) | 50.0% | 4 of 8 |
| ISO/SAE 21434 International (ISO/TC 22/SC 32 with SAE International) | 2.2% | 4 of 183 |
| ISO/IEC 27011:2024 International | 4.0% | 4 of 99 |
| CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.0 United States | 11.4% | 4 of 35 |
| ISO 27018 International | 8.9% | 4 of 45 |
| ISO/IEC 27043:2015 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 4.0% | 4 of 100 |
| Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data (UAE PDPL) United Arab Emirates | 25.0% | 3 of 12 |
| Privacy Act 1988 (Australia) Australia | 37.5% | 3 of 8 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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