4 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 22 controls across our corpus
AS9100D Aerospace Quality Management System Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Process owner attestation
- Tooling configuration export
- Meeting minutes referencing the control
- Training material referencing the control
- After action review template and records
- Learning forum minutes with surfaced assumptions
What closing it also buys you
The 31 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 54
ISO 9001:201514
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.08
ISO/IEC 23894:20237
ISO/IEC 27011:20248
ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents21
BSI IT-Grundschutz4
ISO 27701:20194
API 11644
Belgium CyberFundamentals15
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.020
ISO/IEC 27043:20157
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 4.7% | 15 of 320 |
| ISO 9001:2015 International | 14.1% | 10 of 71 |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 United States | 8.5% | 9 of 106 |
| ISO/IEC 23894:2023 International | 7.4% | 9 of 121 |
| ISO/IEC 27011:2024 International | 8.1% | 8 of 99 |
| ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Australia | 21.6% | 8 of 37 |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 4.4% | 8 of 180 |
| ISO 27701:2019 International | 4.8% | 7 of 145 |
| API 1164 United States (API; referenced by the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines and used internationally) | 4.3% | 7 of 163 |
| Belgium CyberFundamentals Belgium | 15.9% | 7 of 44 |
| CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.0 United States | 20.0% | 7 of 35 |
| ISO/IEC 27043:2015 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 7.0% | 7 of 100 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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