3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 3 controls across our corpus
China Cybersecurity Law (CSL) Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Incident response plan and playbooks
- Incident records, post-incident reviews and reporting to authorities
- Exercises/drills (including OT scenarios)
- Written security programme
- NIST CSF alignment evidence
- Incident response plan
What closing it also buys you
The 4 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)17
New Hampshire Data Privacy Act13
Bahrain PDPL24
APPI23
ISO/IEC 27400:20225
GDPR12
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (FIPS 203, 204, 205)50
BSI IT-Grundschutz2
South Korea ISMS-P3
Barbados Data Protection Act 201917
NIST SP 800-124 Revision 211
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 17.9% | 10 of 56 |
| New Hampshire Data Privacy Act United States - New Hampshire | 13.2% | 7 of 53 |
| Bahrain PDPL Bahrain | 24.1% | 7 of 29 |
| APPI Japan | 23.3% | 7 of 30 |
| FFIEC IT Examination Handbook United States (FRB, FDIC, NCUA, OCC and state banking supervisors) | 0.9% | 5 of 538 |
| ISO/IEC 27400:2022 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 5.0% | 5 of 100 |
| GDPR European Union | 12.2% | 5 of 41 |
| NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (FIPS 203, 204, 205) United States (NIST) | 50.0% | 4 of 8 |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 2.2% | 4 of 180 |
| South Korea ISMS-P South Korea | 3.1% | 4 of 129 |
| Barbados Data Protection Act 2019 Barbados | 17.4% | 4 of 23 |
| NIST SP 800-124 Revision 2 United States | 11.8% | 4 of 34 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
All failure modes ยท
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