3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 11 controls across our corpus
Belgium CyberFundamentals Framework Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Secure configuration baselines per platform
- Change advisory board minutes
- CMDB extracts
- Configuration drift reports
- Software allow-list and usage records
- configuration baselines per device class
What closing it also buys you
The 10 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 51
IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes2
NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security37
API 11641
ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents8
NIST SP 1800-326
ISO/IEC 27019:20244
ISO 270178
ISO 270186
NIST SP 800-1906
NIST SP 800-14525
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 1.2% | 4 of 320 |
| IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes International (IEC); harmonised as EN 62304 under the EU MDR; FDA recognised consensus standard; adopted as ANSI/AAMI/IEC 62304 and nationally | 2.5% | 4 of 158 |
| NIST SP 800-82 Revision 3: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security United States | 37.5% | 3 of 8 |
| API 1164 United States (API; referenced by the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines and used internationally) | 1.8% | 3 of 163 |
| ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Australia | 8.1% | 3 of 37 |
| NIST SP 1800-32 United States | 6.8% | 3 of 44 |
| ISO/IEC 27019:2024 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 4.5% | 3 of 67 |
| ISO 27017 International | 8.1% | 3 of 37 |
| IEC 62443 International (IEC TC 65/WG 10 with ISA99); adopted as EN IEC 62443 | 0.8% | 3 of 399 |
| ISO 27018 International | 6.7% | 3 of 45 |
| NIST SP 800-190 United States | 6.7% | 3 of 45 |
| NIST SP 800-145 United States | 25.0% | 2 of 8 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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