Named by 3 frameworks

missing AOCs

3 of the 723 frameworks in our corpus warn about this same failure, across 15 separate controls. That convergence is the measurement: it is not one standard's opinion.

Data measured , page built 22 September 2026 at 16:18 UTC.

3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 15 controls across our corpus

PCI PIN Security Evidence & Implementation Kit

This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.

See what is in it, $249

The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.

Who warns about it

Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.

What an auditor asks for

The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.

What closing it also buys you

The 15 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that does not.

ISO/IEC 27557:202212
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management6
ISO 310007
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.02
EASA Part-IS8
IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes9
IEC 60601-17
APRA CPS 2348
ISO 2700511
ISO/IEC 23894:20233
PCI P2PE6
AS9100D4

Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred percent. Exact figures below.

Also progressesCovered Controls reached
ISO/IEC 27557:2022
International (ISO/IEC)
12.2%5 of 41
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management
Australia
6.4%3 of 47
ISO 31000
International
7.0%3 of 43
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
United States
2.8%3 of 106
EASA Part-IS
European Union
8.8%3 of 34
IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes
International
9.1%3 of 33
IEC 60601-1
International
7.9%3 of 38
APRA CPS 234
Australia
8.6%3 of 35
ISO 27005
International
11.5%3 of 26
ISO/IEC 23894:2023
International
3.5%3 of 85
PCI P2PE
International
6.8%3 of 44
AS9100D
International (Aerospace)
4.9%3 of 61

Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already touched.

Where this comes from

Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across every framework that names it.

The overlap is computed by traversing 332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control by control against source documents.

Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top is a count of frameworks.

Where this goes next

  1. The other failures the whole industry independently agrees on:The full catalogue →
  2. Everything else PCI P2PE asks for, and what it overlaps with:PCI P2PE in full →
  3. Which companies are disclosing the events this failure produces:Who disclosed it →
  4. What changed in those disclosures this week:What changed →
  5. And today's story, which is usually one of these arriving in public:Today's edition →

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