3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 8 controls across our corpus
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- OT asset inventory and network diagram
- ICS specific incident playbook
- Process owner attestation
- Tooling configuration export
- Meeting minutes referencing the control
- Training material referencing the control
What closing it also buys you
The 8 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
ISO/IEC 27011:20247
NIST SP 800-124 Revision 220
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)12
Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA)12
Nebraska Data Privacy Act75
ISO/IEC 27400:202218
ISO/IEC 2383714
ISO 2704311
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.017
ISO/SAE 2143412
MARS-E62
ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents13
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| ISO/IEC 27011:2024 International | 7.1% | 7 of 99 |
| NIST SP 800-124 Revision 2 United States | 20.6% | 7 of 34 |
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 12.5% | 7 of 56 |
| Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA) Nigeria | 12.0% | 6 of 50 |
| Nebraska Data Privacy Act United States - Nebraska | 75.0% | 6 of 8 |
| ISO/IEC 27400:2022 International | 18.8% | 6 of 32 |
| ISO/IEC 23837 International (ISO/IEC) | 14.3% | 6 of 42 |
| ISO 27043 International | 11.5% | 6 of 52 |
| CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG) 2.0 United States | 17.1% | 6 of 35 |
| ISO/SAE 21434 International | 12.0% | 6 of 50 |
| MARS-E United States | 62.5% | 5 of 8 |
| ASD Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents Australia | 13.5% | 5 of 37 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
All failure modes ยท
The index