6 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 11 controls across our corpus
FBI CJIS Security Policy Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Privacy notice and versioning
- Choice and consent records
- Data subject request logs
- Personal information inventory
- Confidential information inventory
- Encryption configuration baselines
What closing it also buys you
The 11 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)23
ISO/IEC 23894:20236
Austria Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz, DSG, amended 2018)57
GDPR20
SASB Standards11
NIST SP 800-171A Rev 346
ISO/IEC 27011:20247
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.06
ISO/IEC 27557:20229
TISAX25
South Korea ISMS-P24
IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes3
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 23.2% | 13 of 56 |
| ISO/IEC 23894:2023 International | 6.6% | 8 of 121 |
| Austria Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz, DSG, amended 2018) Austria | 57.1% | 8 of 14 |
| GDPR European Union | 20.0% | 8 of 40 |
| SASB Standards International | 11.6% | 8 of 69 |
| NIST SP 800-171A Rev 3 United States (NIST) | 46.7% | 7 of 15 |
| ISO/IEC 27011:2024 International | 7.1% | 7 of 99 |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 United States | 6.6% | 7 of 106 |
| ISO/IEC 27557:2022 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 9.1% | 7 of 77 |
| TISAX International (Automotive) | 25.0% | 7 of 28 |
| South Korea ISMS-P South Korea | 24.0% | 6 of 25 |
| IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes International (IEC); harmonised as EN 62304 under the EU MDR; FDA recognised consensus standard; adopted as ANSI/AAMI/IEC 62304 and nationally | 3.8% | 6 of 158 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
All failure modes ยท
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