3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 8 controls across our corpus
COSO 2013 Internal Control Integrated Framework Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Penetration test report with retest evidence
- Threat intelligence feed subscriptions and triage workflow
- Risk acceptance memos signed by accountable executives
- Vulnerability scan reports for internal, external, and authenticated scopes
- Risk register with likelihood, impact, and treatment owners
- Control implementation statement for RA-7 citing the system mission and inheritance from common controls
What closing it also buys you
The 4 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.014
SOC 213
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 52
Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.13
PCI DSS 4.02
ISO 27002:20224
ISO 27001:20223
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management9
DORA11
NIST SP 800-161 Rev 11
Azure Security Benchmark3
C5 (Germany)2
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 United States | 14.2% | 15 of 106 |
| SOC 2 United States | 13.1% | 8 of 61 |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 2.5% | 8 of 320 |
| Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) v4.0.1 International | 3.0% | 6 of 197 |
| PCI DSS 4.0 International | 2.0% | 5 of 249 |
| ISO 27002:2022 International | 4.8% | 5 of 104 |
| ISO 27001:2022 International | 3.2% | 4 of 125 |
| APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management Australia | 9.3% | 4 of 43 |
| DORA European Union | 11.5% | 3 of 26 |
| NIST SP 800-161 Rev 1 United States | 1.6% | 3 of 191 |
| Azure Security Benchmark International | 3.5% | 3 of 85 |
| C5 (Germany) Germany | 2.5% | 3 of 121 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
All failure modes ยท
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