3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 15 controls across our corpus
PCI PIN Security Evidence & Implementation Kit
This is the complete documentation set: an adopt-ready artifact for every control in policy and procedure text you edit rather than draft, and the evidence checklist an auditor asks for against each.
See what is in it, $249
The same set every buyer of this kit receives. Nothing here is produced on request.
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- TPSP register
- AOC collection log
- contractual responsibility matrix
- monitoring cadence
What closing it also buys you
The 15 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
ISO/IEC 27557:20226
SASB Standards5
APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management7
ISO 310007
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.02
EASA Part-IS4
IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes1
IEC 60601-11
ISO 2700511
ISO/IEC 23894:20232
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| ISO/IEC 27557:2022 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 6.5% | 5 of 77 |
| SASB Standards International | 5.8% | 4 of 69 |
| APRA CPS 230 Operational Risk Management Australia | 7.0% | 3 of 43 |
| ISO 31000 International | 7.0% | 3 of 43 |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 United States | 2.8% | 3 of 106 |
| EASA Part-IS European Union (EASA Member States) | 4.1% | 3 of 74 |
| IEC 62304:2015 Medical Device Software Lifecycle Processes International (IEC); harmonised as EN 62304 under the EU MDR; FDA recognised consensus standard; adopted as ANSI/AAMI/IEC 62304 and nationally | 1.9% | 3 of 158 |
| IEC 60601-1 International (IEC); adopted as EN 60601-1, ANSI/AAMI ES60601-1, CSA C22.2 No. 60601-1 and nationally | 1.9% | 3 of 157 |
| ISO 27005 International | 11.5% | 3 of 26 |
| ISO/IEC 23894:2023 International | 2.5% | 3 of 121 |
| PCI P2PE Global (PCI Security Standards Council; P2PE solution providers, component providers, application vendors and merchants operating merchant-managed solutions) | 0.7% | 3 of 407 |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 0.9% | 3 of 320 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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