Named by 3 frameworks

Consent capture mechanisms do not record granularity required by law

3 of the 723 frameworks in our corpus warn about this same failure, across 6 separate controls. That convergence is the measurement: it is not one standard's opinion.

Data measured , page built 22 September 2026 at 16:18 UTC.

3 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 6 controls across our corpus

Who warns about it

Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.

What an auditor asks for

The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.

What closing it also buys you

The 6 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that does not.

GDPR15
NIST Privacy Framework62
Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA)10
Nebraska Data Privacy Act62
UK Age Appropriate Design Code (Children's Code)25
Trinidad and Tobago Data Protection Act 201180
Tanzania Personal Data Protection Act (Draft)17
Oregon Consumer Privacy Act50
NIST SP 800-12250
New Hampshire Data Privacy Act50
Malaysia PDPA 201050
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)26

Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred percent. Exact figures below.

Also progressesCovered Controls reached
GDPR
European Union
15.0%6 of 40
NIST Privacy Framework
United States
62.5%5 of 8
Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA)
Nigeria
10.0%5 of 50
Nebraska Data Privacy Act
United States - Nebraska
62.5%5 of 8
UK Age Appropriate Design Code (Children's Code)
United Kingdom
25.0%5 of 20
Trinidad and Tobago Data Protection Act 2011
Trinidad and Tobago
80.0%4 of 5
Tanzania Personal Data Protection Act (Draft)
Tanzania
17.4%4 of 23
Oregon Consumer Privacy Act
United States - Oregon
50.0%4 of 8
NIST SP 800-122
United States
50.0%4 of 8
New Hampshire Data Privacy Act
United States - New Hampshire
50.0%4 of 8
Malaysia PDPA 2010
Malaysia
50.0%4 of 8
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
United States
26.7%4 of 15

Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already touched.

Where this comes from

Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across every framework that names it.

The overlap is computed by traversing 332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control by control against source documents.

Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top is a count of frameworks.

Where this goes next

  1. The other failures the whole industry independently agrees on:The full catalogue →
  2. Everything else South Korea ISMS-P asks for, and what it overlaps with:South Korea ISMS-P in full →
  3. Which companies are disclosing the events this failure produces:Who disclosed it →
  4. What changed in those disclosures this week:What changed →
  5. And today's story, which is usually one of these arriving in public:Today's edition →

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