4 standards bodies wrote this down separately. None of them consulted the others. That is not a preference you can argue with, it is what happens.From 39 controls across our corpus
Who warns about it
Every framework below independently names this failure. They were written by different
bodies, in different jurisdictions, for different industries, and they agree.
What an auditor asks for
The artefacts named on the controls that warn about this failure. This is what closes
it, and what you will be asked to produce when somebody checks.
- Approved governance policy with documented scope and accountabilities
- Board or steering committee minutes evidencing oversight
- Roles and responsibilities matrix (RACI)
- Risk register with treatment plans and owner sign-offs
- Risk appetite statement approved by the board
- Periodic risk review reports
What closing it also buys you
The 43 controls that warn about this failure map onto controls in other
frameworks. Close them here and this much of each of those is closed too. It is the same work
counted once, which is usually the difference between a programme that finishes and one that
does not.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 53
ISO/IEC 23894:20237
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.07
UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI18
TISAX25
BSI IT-Grundschutz3
API 11644
ISO/IEC 27557:20229
Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023)12
Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) Programmes16
ISO 1348529
IEC 624431
Scaled against the framework this reaches furthest into, not against a hundred
percent. Exact figures below.
| Also progresses | Covered |
Controls reached |
|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 United States | 3.8% | 12 of 320 |
| ISO/IEC 23894:2023 International | 7.4% | 9 of 121 |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 United States | 7.5% | 8 of 106 |
| UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI International | 18.4% | 7 of 38 |
| TISAX International (Automotive) | 25.0% | 7 of 28 |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz Germany (used across the German-speaking countries and by German public bodies under the UP Bund) | 3.9% | 7 of 180 |
| API 1164 United States (API; referenced by the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines and used internationally) | 4.3% | 7 of 163 |
| ISO/IEC 27557:2022 International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) | 9.1% | 7 of 77 |
| Switzerland New Federal Act on Data Protection (nFADP/nDSG, 2023) Switzerland | 12.5% | 7 of 56 |
| Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) Programmes International (97+ countries) | 16.7% | 7 of 42 |
| ISO 13485 International | 29.2% | 7 of 24 |
| IEC 62443 International (IEC TC 65/WG 10 with ISA99); adopted as EN IEC 62443 | 1.8% | 7 of 399 |
Read as: closing this failure reaches that share of the named
framework's control library through cross-framework mappings held in our corpus. It is not a
claim of compliance with that framework, it is a measure of how much of it you have already
touched.
Where this comes from
Harvested from the control library itself. Every control in our corpus carries the evidence an
auditor expects and the ways implementations commonly fail, recorded when that control was
verified against its source document. This page is those two fields, for one failure, across
every framework that names it.
The overlap is computed by traversing
332,959 cross-framework control mappings out from the specific controls that
warn about this failure, not from the frameworks they sit in. Those mappings were built control
by control against source documents.
Nothing here is inferred, predicted or scored. The number at the top
is a count of frameworks.
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