United Kingdom

UK Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021

73 controls. 152 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

Page built . This page is derived from the framework corpus, which changes when the corpus is extended rather than daily.

73 controls 152 frameworks share controls with it United Kingdom verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
UK-TSA-MON-01Security Monitoring23
UK-TSA-MON-02Incident Notification54
UK-TSA-MON-03Ofcom Enforcement0
UK-TSA-NET-01Security Architecture90
UK-TSA-NET-02Access Control and Authentication68
UK-TSA-NET-03Supply Chain Security43
UKTSA-1Security Duties (Sections 105A-D)0
UKTSA-2Code of Practice and Network Architecture0
UKTSA-3Supply Chain and Equipment Security0
UKTSA-4Incident Reporting and Ofcom Cooperation0
ACTCommunications Act 2003 ss.105A to 105Y as inserted by the 2021 Act: security duties of network and service providers (in force 1 October 2022)0
COPTelecommunications Security Code of Practice v1.1 (July 2026): measure groups and their Tier 1 and Tier 2 dates0
DVDDesignated vendor directions, ss.105Z1 to 105Z29 (in force 17 November 2021)0
ENFORCEEnforcement and penalties0
FRAMEWORKThe telecoms security framework and its three layers0
M1M1.01 to M1.06 Exposed edge: records of external systems, two-yearly testing, and separation from security critical functions0
M10aM10.01 to M10.19 Third party supplier contracts: records, shared responsibility, control of data, 48-hour incident notice, 30-day root cause and managed service exit0
M10bM10.20 to M10.35 Third party administrators: mediated, ticketed and logged access, per-provider segregation and testing of the administrator0
M10cM10.36 to M10.54 Equipment suppliers and patching: security declarations, secure deployment guidance, support periods, vulnerability fixes and 14-day patching of exploited flaws0
M11M11.01 to M11.42 Management plane: formal change, ticketed time-bound privileged access, break-glass controls, segregated management plane and hardened privileged access workstatio0
M12M12.01 to M12.05 Signalling monitoring: monitor and analyse signalling, protect signalling records, alert others and fuzz interfaces0
M13M13.01 to M13.28, M19.01 to M19.07 Virtualisation: locked-down fabric, trust domains and host pools, no containers as trust boundaries, and automated, attested administration0
M14M14.01 to M14.03 End-of-life equipment conditions, blocking unauthorised SIM over-the-air messages, and security retained after upgrades0
M15M15.01 to M15.13 Network oversight functions: patched, rebuilt from known-good state, on trusted platforms, managed only from privileged workstations and monitored0
M16M16.01 to M16.22, M20.01 Security monitoring and analysis: skilled analysts, threat hunting, 13-month logs, near real-time analysis within five minutes and anomaly models0
M17M17.01, M18.01 to M18.06 Administration through systems, not direct device access; signalling resilience, hub addressing, authenticated outgoing signalling and hidden topology0
M2M2.01 to M2.06, M6.01 to M6.05 Privileged access basics: review, logging, secure protocols, unique accounts, MFA and no default or hardcoded accounts0
M21M21.01 to M21.07 Retaining national resilience: UK-located oversight functions, UK capability, offshore data governance and one month of UK connectivity without international links0
M22M22.01 to M22.04 New v1.1 measures by March 2028: further CAF processes, test network default passwords and permitted signalling for fixed networks0
M23M23.01 to M23.03 New v1.1 measures by December 2028: SIM provider certificate checks, automated vulnerability scanning and validated automation pipelines0
M24M24.01 to M24.09 New v1.1 measures by December 2029: logging tests, number analysis data, threat modelling, trusted boot, CPE anomaly blocking, service accounts, APIs and unused se0
M3M3.01 to M3.19, M7.01 to M7.04 Signalling and routing security: understand and filter signalling, do not trust source addresses, secure BGP and prevent spoofing0
M4M4.01 to M4.08, M8.01 to M8.16 Procurement and SIM risk: assess suppliers before contract, test security, track end-of-life equipment, and protect SIM keys0
M5M5.01 to M5.07 Supporting business processes: CAF-based processes, prioritised security changes, restorable read-only backups and incident management0
M9M9.01 to M9.06 Customer premises equipment: unique credentials, supported devices, restricted and secure management, inbound connections blocked0
REGElectronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022, SI 2022/933 (in force 1 October 2022)0
STATUSStatus in September 20260
TIERSTiers and the legal effect of the Code of Practice0
r10reg.10 Govern security from board level: policy, incident categorisation, risk reporting, post-incident review and insider risk0
r11reg.11 Review security measures regularly and produce a written 12-month risk assessment at least yearly0
r12reg.12 Deploy patches and mitigations in a time suited to severity, and record governance decisions to take longer than 14 days0
r13reg.13 Ensure responsible persons are competent and resourced, and configure new supplier equipment securely0
r14reg.14 Carry out realistic, unannounced security testing, including of people and physical access0
r15reg.15 Share information about compromises that may affect other networks, and give and request assistance0
r3areg.3(1) to (4) Design, redesign and maintain the network to reduce security risk, and record risks and exposure yearly0
r3breg.3(3)(d), (e), 3(5) Protect and appropriately locate security critical functions, secure equipment through its lifecycle, and contain compromises0
r3creg.3(3)(f) Be able to identify risks and operate the network without reliance on persons, equipment or data outside the UK0
r4areg.4(1) to (4)(a) Protect operational data and network functions, and keep privileged workstations away from incoming signals0
r4breg.4(4)(b), (c), 4(5) Monitor and reduce risks from incoming signals and customer equipment, and use encrypted signals within the network0
r4creg.4(6), (7) Service providers: monitor and reduce SIM card risks and replace SIMs where appropriate0
r5reg.5 Keep real-time monitoring and content analysis tools out of reach of the listed countries0
r6areg.6(1), (2) Monitor and analyse access to and operation of security critical functions, automated where possible, and investigate anomalies0
r6breg.6(3) Record all access to security critical functions, alert on manual changes, analyse promptly and keep data 13 months0
r6creg.6(4) Record type, location, software, hardware and identifiers of equipment supplied to customers0
r7areg.7(1) to (3), 7(4)(a) Identify and reduce third party supplier risk and bind suppliers contractually to security measures0
r7breg.7(4)(b), (c), 7(5) Secure supplier connections and data sharing, plan exits, and keep a written plan for supply interruption0
r8areg.8(1), (2) Reduce unauthorised access: multi-factor authentication, two-person changes, no default credentials, automated changes0
r8breg.8(3) to (5) Isolate security critical functions from unsafe signals and keep security permissions and credentials minimal, individual and unique0
r8creg.8(6) Give no security permission to anyone while in a listed country, and prevent its use from there0
r9areg.9(1), (2)(a), (b), (3) Prepare to limit and recover from compromises, keeping online and offline copies in the UK0
r9breg.9(2)(c) Have means to assess, contain and deal with compromises, including a written plan when effects cannot be prevented within 14 days0
s105As.105A Take appropriate and proportionate measures to identify, reduce and prepare for security compromises0
s105Cs.105C Take measures to prevent adverse effects of a compromise and remedy or mitigate its effect0
s105Is.105I When notified by OFCOM, explain any failure to act in accordance with the Code of Practice0
s105Js.105J Tell affected users of a significant risk of a security compromise, in clear and plain language0
s105Ks.105K Inform OFCOM as soon as reasonably practicable of significant security compromises0
s105Ls.105L(6) to (8) Comply with OFCOM directions to inform users or the public of a security compromise0
s105Nss.105N, 105O, 105P Cooperate with OFCOM security assessments and comply with assessment notices0
s105Uss.105U, 105V Take interim steps directed by OFCOM pending enforcement0
s105Z1ss.105Z1 to 105Z3 Comply with the requirements of a designated vendor direction0
s105Z14ss.105Z12, 105Z14, 105Z15 Comply with OFCOM inspection notices on designated vendor compliance, without defeating them, and pay their costs0
s105Z25ss.105Z22 to 105Z25, 105Z27 Obey urgent enforcement directions, keep directions confidential when required, and supply information on request0
s105Z7s.105Z7 Prepare and provide a compliance plan when the Secretary of State requires one0

Tell me when UK Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 files something new

One email when a public company newly discloses something this framework governs, naming the company and what our corpus says it puts in scope. Nothing else, and one click to stop.

What an auditor will ask you to produce

The artefacts named on the failure modes this framework speaks to.

  • Recovery test plan
  • Test reports comparing expected and actual recovery duration
  • Actions on failed tests
  • Backup strategy and life cycle policy
  • Backup job logs
  • Restoration test results
  • Audit reports with dates showing the two-year cycle
  • Corrective action plans following audit findings
  • Four dated risk assessments per year covering the CII
  • Vulnerability findings with treatment decisions

How programmes fail on this

Failure modes named by this framework and others. Each opens the full record.

What this page is

A control-level reference for UK Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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