United States (National Security Agency, National Manager for National Security Systems)

NSA Guidance for Transition to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography

74 controls. 79 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

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74 controls 79 frameworks share controls with it United States (National Security Agency, National Manager for National Security Systems) verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
QRCM-1.1Cryptographic Asset Inventory12
QRCM-1.2Quantum-Vulnerable Identification53
QRCM-1.3Data Classification for Migration22
QRCM-3.1Hybrid Solution Deployment (2025-2030)53
QRCM-3.2CNSA 2.0 Algorithm Preference0
QRCM-3.3RSA/ECC Deprecation0
QRCM-4.1NSM-10 Compliance0
QRCM-4.2TLS 1.3 Adoption53
QRCM-4.3Quantum-Safe Product Categories0
QRMIG-01Migration Programme Establishment0
QRMIG-02Cryptographic Asset Discovery0
QRMIG-03Prioritisation and Risk Assessment0
QRMIG-04Vendor Engagement and Roadmaps0
QRMIG-05Pilot Implementation0
QRMIG-06Hybrid Algorithm Strategy0
QRMIG-07Cryptographic Agility0
QRMIG-08Public Key Infrastructure Update0
QRMIG-09Key Management Modernisation1
QRMIG-10Application Code Refactor0
QRMIG-11Cloud Service Transition0
QRMIG-12Identity Federation and Smart Cards0
QRMIG-13Network Device Transition0
QRMIG-14Operational Technology0
QRMIG-15Records Retention and Long Lived Data0
QRMIG-16Testing and Validation Programme0
QRMIG-17Communication and Stakeholder Reporting13
QRMIG-18Training and Capability Building0
QRMIG-19Post Migration Assurance0
QRMIG-20Decommissioning of Legacy Cryptography0
CIVILThe parallel civilian regime, which does not apply to NSS0
DOWThe Department of War's implementation: the November 2025 CIO memo and the April 2026 PQC Strategy0
GUIDANCEThe guidance: what NSA requires for the NSS transition and under which authorities0
NNSM-10 duties of agencies operating NSS0
N-INVN-INV Identify and document every use of quantum-vulnerable cryptography in NSS and give it to the National Manager0
N-PLANN-PLAN Submit and annually update a plan to transition all NSS to quantum-resistant cryptography0
N-REPORTN-REPORT Report progress on CNSA 1.0 and 2.0 and every deviation, measured at SC-12, while any component is not quantum-resistant0
N-SYMN-SYM Symmetric-key protections for quantum-vulnerable key exchanges by 31 December 20230
PCNSSP 15 milestones for NSS0
P-2025P-2025 CNSA 1.0 acceptable through 31 December 2025; earlier CNSSP 15 waivers cancelled, six months to comply or 90 days to seek a new waiver0
P-2027P-2027 CNSA 2.0 required in all new products and services from 1 January 20270
P-2030P-2030 Equipment and services that cannot or will not move to CNSA 2.0 replaced by 31 December 20300
P-2031P-2031 CNSA 2.0 mandated for all protocol use by 31 December 2031; transition complete by 20350
P-ACQP-ACQ Acquire cryptographic products that use the approved algorithms, an NSA-approved key source and protected update mechanisms0
P-EVALP-EVAL Products protecting NSS evaluated or validated under CNSSP 11 or NSA guidance; NSA-approved solutions for classified data1
P-HEADSP-HEADS Agency heads ensure compliance, pass unmet requirements to the National Manager and keep reporting quantum-vulnerable systems0
P-PROTOP-PROTO Use NSA-approved public standards-based cryptographic protocols; NSA approves any other algorithm0
QNSA transition positions0
Q-CSFCQ-CSFC CSfC transition: CNSA 2.0 objective in 2026, required in capability packages from 2028, all registered solutions post-quantum by 2030, TLS 1.3 throughout0
Q-HYBRIDQ-HYBRID No hybrid or non-standardised quantum-resistant solution on NSS mission systems outside NSA's named exceptions0
Q-NOVELQ-NOVEL Consult NSA before using cryptography CNSA does not specify; no lightweight ciphers0
Q-PKIQ-PKI Stand up quantum-resistant certificate authorities and plan identity transition to completion0
Q-PSKQ-PSK CSfC solutions protecting long-life data use pre-shared keys in at least one tunnel, with certificates for mutual authentication and full PSK management0
Q-QKDQ-QKD Do not use or research quantum key distribution for NSS without consulting NSA; quantum RNGs only within an approval1
Q-ROOTQ-ROOT All new hardware upgradeable to full quantum resistance, with a quantum-resistant hardware root of trust0
Q-TESTQ-TEST Test CNSA 2.0 now in research environments and deploy validated products in mission systems as they arrive0
RQuantum-readiness roadmap0
R-CLOUDR-CLOUD Engage cloud service providers on their roadmaps, then on enabling PQC by configuration or update0
R-CONTRACTR-CONTRACT Plan contract changes so new products arrive with PQC and older products are upgraded to meet the timelines0
R-CUSTOMR-CUSTOM For custom-built technology, assess the risk and either migrate it or mitigate its continued use0
R-DATAR-DATA Tie the inventory to the most sensitive data, its protection lifetime and existing asset programmes1
R-INVR-INV Build a cryptographic inventory with discovery tools across protocols, systems and the development pipeline1
R-RISKR-RISK Feed the quantum-vulnerable inventory into risk assessment and prioritise1
R-TEAMR-TEAM Establish a quantum-readiness roadmap led by a project management team1
R-VENDORR-VENDOR Engage technology vendors on their quantum-readiness roadmaps, with dates and costs per COTS product1
R-VENDORRESPR-VENDORRESP Vendors plan and test PQC integration and prepare to support it as soon as NIST standards are final1
STATUSStatus in September 2026: NSM-8 rescinded, EO 14412 and NSPM-12, NIAP Policy Letter 330
TTransition timeline by system type0
T-LEGACYT-LEGACY Custom applications and legacy equipment: update or replace by 20330
T-METHODT-METHOD Profile-driven transition: new equipment meets CNSA 2.0 protection profiles, older equipment at its next update, prefer on availability, waiver for what is not refreshed0
T-NETT-NET Traditional networking equipment such as VPNs and routers: support and prefer by 2026, exclusive use by 20300
T-NICHET-NICHE Niche equipment such as constrained devices and large PKI systems: support and prefer by 2030, exclusive use by 20330
T-OST-OS Operating systems: support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2027, exclusive use by 20330
T-SIGNT-SIGN Software and firmware signing: transition now, CNSA 2.0 for new code by 2025, exclusive use by 20300
T-WEBT-WEB Web browsers, web servers and cloud services: support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2025, exclusive use by 20330

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What this page is

A control-level reference for NSA Guidance for Transition to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography, drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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