QRCM-1.1 | Cryptographic Asset Inventory | 12 |
QRCM-1.2 | Quantum-Vulnerable Identification | 53 |
QRCM-1.3 | Data Classification for Migration | 22 |
QRCM-3.1 | Hybrid Solution Deployment (2025-2030) | 53 |
QRCM-3.2 | CNSA 2.0 Algorithm Preference | 0 |
QRCM-3.3 | RSA/ECC Deprecation | 0 |
QRCM-4.1 | NSM-10 Compliance | 0 |
QRCM-4.2 | TLS 1.3 Adoption | 53 |
QRCM-4.3 | Quantum-Safe Product Categories | 0 |
QRMIG-01 | Migration Programme Establishment | 0 |
QRMIG-02 | Cryptographic Asset Discovery | 0 |
QRMIG-03 | Prioritisation and Risk Assessment | 0 |
QRMIG-04 | Vendor Engagement and Roadmaps | 0 |
QRMIG-05 | Pilot Implementation | 0 |
QRMIG-06 | Hybrid Algorithm Strategy | 0 |
QRMIG-07 | Cryptographic Agility | 0 |
QRMIG-08 | Public Key Infrastructure Update | 0 |
QRMIG-09 | Key Management Modernisation | 1 |
QRMIG-10 | Application Code Refactor | 0 |
QRMIG-11 | Cloud Service Transition | 0 |
QRMIG-12 | Identity Federation and Smart Cards | 0 |
QRMIG-13 | Network Device Transition | 0 |
QRMIG-14 | Operational Technology | 0 |
QRMIG-15 | Records Retention and Long Lived Data | 0 |
QRMIG-16 | Testing and Validation Programme | 0 |
QRMIG-17 | Communication and Stakeholder Reporting | 13 |
QRMIG-18 | Training and Capability Building | 0 |
QRMIG-19 | Post Migration Assurance | 0 |
QRMIG-20 | Decommissioning of Legacy Cryptography | 0 |
CIVIL | The parallel civilian regime, which does not apply to NSS | 0 |
DOW | The Department of War's implementation: the November 2025 CIO memo and the April 2026 PQC Strategy | 0 |
GUIDANCE | The guidance: what NSA requires for the NSS transition and under which authorities | 0 |
N | NSM-10 duties of agencies operating NSS | 0 |
N-INV | N-INV Identify and document every use of quantum-vulnerable cryptography in NSS and give it to the National Manager | 0 |
N-PLAN | N-PLAN Submit and annually update a plan to transition all NSS to quantum-resistant cryptography | 0 |
N-REPORT | N-REPORT Report progress on CNSA 1.0 and 2.0 and every deviation, measured at SC-12, while any component is not quantum-resistant | 0 |
N-SYM | N-SYM Symmetric-key protections for quantum-vulnerable key exchanges by 31 December 2023 | 0 |
P | CNSSP 15 milestones for NSS | 0 |
P-2025 | P-2025 CNSA 1.0 acceptable through 31 December 2025; earlier CNSSP 15 waivers cancelled, six months to comply or 90 days to seek a new waiver | 0 |
P-2027 | P-2027 CNSA 2.0 required in all new products and services from 1 January 2027 | 0 |
P-2030 | P-2030 Equipment and services that cannot or will not move to CNSA 2.0 replaced by 31 December 2030 | 0 |
P-2031 | P-2031 CNSA 2.0 mandated for all protocol use by 31 December 2031; transition complete by 2035 | 0 |
P-ACQ | P-ACQ Acquire cryptographic products that use the approved algorithms, an NSA-approved key source and protected update mechanisms | 0 |
P-EVAL | P-EVAL Products protecting NSS evaluated or validated under CNSSP 11 or NSA guidance; NSA-approved solutions for classified data | 1 |
P-HEADS | P-HEADS Agency heads ensure compliance, pass unmet requirements to the National Manager and keep reporting quantum-vulnerable systems | 0 |
P-PROTO | P-PROTO Use NSA-approved public standards-based cryptographic protocols; NSA approves any other algorithm | 0 |
Q | NSA transition positions | 0 |
Q-CSFC | Q-CSFC CSfC transition: CNSA 2.0 objective in 2026, required in capability packages from 2028, all registered solutions post-quantum by 2030, TLS 1.3 throughout | 0 |
Q-HYBRID | Q-HYBRID No hybrid or non-standardised quantum-resistant solution on NSS mission systems outside NSA's named exceptions | 0 |
Q-NOVEL | Q-NOVEL Consult NSA before using cryptography CNSA does not specify; no lightweight ciphers | 0 |
Q-PKI | Q-PKI Stand up quantum-resistant certificate authorities and plan identity transition to completion | 0 |
Q-PSK | Q-PSK CSfC solutions protecting long-life data use pre-shared keys in at least one tunnel, with certificates for mutual authentication and full PSK management | 0 |
Q-QKD | Q-QKD Do not use or research quantum key distribution for NSS without consulting NSA; quantum RNGs only within an approval | 1 |
Q-ROOT | Q-ROOT All new hardware upgradeable to full quantum resistance, with a quantum-resistant hardware root of trust | 0 |
Q-TEST | Q-TEST Test CNSA 2.0 now in research environments and deploy validated products in mission systems as they arrive | 0 |
R | Quantum-readiness roadmap | 0 |
R-CLOUD | R-CLOUD Engage cloud service providers on their roadmaps, then on enabling PQC by configuration or update | 0 |
R-CONTRACT | R-CONTRACT Plan contract changes so new products arrive with PQC and older products are upgraded to meet the timelines | 0 |
R-CUSTOM | R-CUSTOM For custom-built technology, assess the risk and either migrate it or mitigate its continued use | 0 |
R-DATA | R-DATA Tie the inventory to the most sensitive data, its protection lifetime and existing asset programmes | 1 |
R-INV | R-INV Build a cryptographic inventory with discovery tools across protocols, systems and the development pipeline | 1 |
R-RISK | R-RISK Feed the quantum-vulnerable inventory into risk assessment and prioritise | 1 |
R-TEAM | R-TEAM Establish a quantum-readiness roadmap led by a project management team | 1 |
R-VENDOR | R-VENDOR Engage technology vendors on their quantum-readiness roadmaps, with dates and costs per COTS product | 1 |
R-VENDORRESP | R-VENDORRESP Vendors plan and test PQC integration and prepare to support it as soon as NIST standards are final | 1 |
STATUS | Status in September 2026: NSM-8 rescinded, EO 14412 and NSPM-12, NIAP Policy Letter 33 | 0 |
T | Transition timeline by system type | 0 |
T-LEGACY | T-LEGACY Custom applications and legacy equipment: update or replace by 2033 | 0 |
T-METHOD | T-METHOD Profile-driven transition: new equipment meets CNSA 2.0 protection profiles, older equipment at its next update, prefer on availability, waiver for what is not refreshed | 0 |
T-NET | T-NET Traditional networking equipment such as VPNs and routers: support and prefer by 2026, exclusive use by 2030 | 0 |
T-NICHE | T-NICHE Niche equipment such as constrained devices and large PKI systems: support and prefer by 2030, exclusive use by 2033 | 0 |
T-OS | T-OS Operating systems: support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2027, exclusive use by 2033 | 0 |
T-SIGN | T-SIGN Software and firmware signing: transition now, CNSA 2.0 for new code by 2025, exclusive use by 2030 | 0 |
T-WEB | T-WEB Web browsers, web servers and cloud services: support and prefer CNSA 2.0 by 2025, exclusive use by 2033 | 0 |