Netherlands

Netherlands Baseline Information Security for Government 2 (BIO2)

139 controls. 0 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

Page built . This page is derived from the framework corpus, which changes when the corpus is extended rather than daily.

139 controls 0 frameworks share controls with it Netherlands verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

No measured overlap with another framework in the corpus.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
5.01.01Board-adopted information security policy with the required content0
5.01.02Annual policy review aligned with governance cycles0
5.02.01Board-defined roles and responsibilities across security, privacy, OT and BCM0
5.02.02Appoint a CISO authorised to advise and report independently0
5.04.01Regular cyber awareness courses for board and staff, and demonstrable board competence0
5.05.01Register of officials holding formal contacts with agencies and regulators0
5.08.01Explicit risk assessment for new systems and significant changes0
5.09.01Complete and verified asset inventory including OT, remote and cloud assets0
5.10.02Rules of conduct for asset use in contracts of external staff and volunteers0
5.10.03All employees formally made aware of the code of conduct for asset use0
5.12.01Classify information in all systems with an explicit risk assessment and impact methodology0
5.14.01Internet-facing systems and email comply with the mandatory open standards, monitored via internet.nl0
5.14.02Organisation Validated certificates for sensitive web traffic0
5.14.03Electronic signatures conform to the AdES baseline profiles0
5.14.04Up-to-date records of internet-facing systems, web applications, IP addresses and APIs0
5.14.05Publish public websites in the Government Register of Internet Domains, refreshed every six months0
5.15.01Access to a trusted zone only from authenticated devices or a secure enclave0
5.16.01Formal registration and de-registration procedure for user identities0
5.16.02Group accounts only when motivated, recorded and agreed with the CISO0
5.17.01Multi-factor authentication, mitigations where it is impossible, and authentication data management0
5.17.02Password manager available to all employees0
5.17.03Automated enforcement of password requirements0
5.18.01Monitor creation and modification of privileged accounts; unauthorised changes are incidents0
5.18.02Annual review of all access rights, with risk-based higher frequency0
5.19.01Risk-based information security requirements in every request for proposal0
5.20.01Security requirements written into procurement contracts0
5.20.02Exclude suppliers' general terms and define acceptable, mitigated and never-accepted consequences0
5.20.03Supplier demonstrates setup, existence and operation annually through independent assessment0
5.20.04Entity's own investigations, including the option of an external audit, and treatment of residual risk0
5.20.05Supplier transparency on vulnerabilities and incidents, including data leaks0
5.20.06Pre-contract dependency assessment and a detailed exit strategy0
5.21.02Supplier discloses its subcontractor chain and risks before contracting0
5.21.03Security requirements flow down the subcontractor chain, exclusions justified0
5.21.04Supplier reports changes in the subcontractor chain and their risks during the contract0
5.21.05Include supply chain security in the entity's risk analysis0
5.22.01Process owner reviews supplier compliance annually and treats the risks0
5.22.02Up-to-date register of suppliers and contracts0
5.23.01Cloud service provider policy covering inventory to termination, reviewed every three years0
5.24.01Low-threshold notification desk for all internal and external staff0
5.24.02Notification desk tasks and responsibilities in an incident reporting procedure0
5.24.03Process owner responsible for resolving incidents0
5.24.04Monthly incident follow-up report to the person ultimately responsible for operations0
5.24.05Incident procedure references the crisis management procedure0
5.24.07Incident procedure: statutory CSIRT reporting, CSIRT notifications and notifying PII principals0
5.24.08Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure procedure, published, with reports feeding incident records0
5.26.02Handle incidents through the incident management process, with regulatory reporting built in0
5.27.01Root cause analysis and improvements after incidents0
5.27.02Share incident analysis reports widely among relevant partners0
5.28.01Retain incident information for at least three years0
5.30.01Annual test of continuity plans by the process owner0
5.30.02Identify critical systems in the asset inventory and update at least every three years0
5.33.01Retention periods set in selection lists, implemented and tested0
5.35.02Annual audit plan deciding which systems get which security audit0
5.36.01Information security reporting in the P&C cycle leading to an annual In Control Statement0
6.01.01Established screening policy, with Certificate of Conduct on a risk basis0
6.02.01Staff made aware of their security responsibilities on joining or changing roles, with easy access to the rules0
6.03.01Everyone shares responsibility and knows the rules, including for classified environments0
6.03.02Security awareness training completed within three months of appointment0
6.03.03Management promotes and encourages periodic security training0
6.03.04Secure mobile working behaviour in awareness programmes0
6.08.01All staff demonstrably informed of the incident notification procedure0
7.01.02Critical information never reachable through a single secure zone0
7.02.01Warnings on specific security risks shared within the government security domain0
7.07.01Automatic lock on removal of a chip card token0
7.10.01Removal instruction for reusable media leaving the entity0
7.10.02Verify and report irretrievable removal, using NBV-advised products where possible0
7.10.03Couriers for classified information meet predefined reliability requirements0
8.01.01Zero footprint on mobile devices, or encryption-based access control with remote wipe0
8.01.02Patching and hardening, MDM or MAM, signed mobile working agreement, checked periodically0
8.02.01Quarterly assessment of special privileges0
8.03.01Physical or logical isolation of information of specific importance0
8.03.02Need-to-know access to information of specific importance0
8.05.01Risk assessment before granting network access to external suppliers, with a rights register0
8.07.01Risk- and need-based restriction of downloads, always scanned0
8.07.02Users informed about risky browsing and unknown links0
8.07.03Anti-malware and recovery software kept up to date0
8.07.04Malware scanning across all environments, downloads and received files0
8.08.01Mitigate high-likelihood, high-damage vulnerabilities within a week0
8.08.02Mitigation approach based on an explicit risk assessment0
8.08.03Interim mitigations where installation cannot happen within a week0
8.08.04Technical compliance checks, with continuous testing of internet-facing systems0
8.08.05Automated penetration test at every release of internet-facing systems; annual test; no go-live with unmitigated high risks0
8.13.01Backup policy with storage and protection requirements, ransomware-resistant and integrity-preserving0
8.13.02Maximum data loss and recovery time set by explicit risk assessment0
8.13.03Location-separated backup storage0
8.13.04Annual recovery test, or after a big change0
8.15.01Minimum content of a log entry0
8.15.02Log entries never contain data that could cause a security breach0
8.15.03List of generated log files0
8.15.04Risk-based retention of logs and SIEM data allowing for long-undetected attackers0
8.15.05Improper modification or deletion of log data is an incident0
8.15.06Independent periodic verification that log files remain unchanged0
8.16.01Share newly discovered attacks with the designated CERT0
8.16.02SIEM and SOC rules on when to report incidents to responsible managers0
8.16.03Detection and response solution for the information processing environment0
8.16.04Logging and log monitoring on active network components0
8.18.01System utilities restricted to authorised staff when strictly necessary0
8.18.02Log use of system utilities and keep the logs six months0
8.19.01Control the risk of users installing unauthorised software0
8.20.01Network components meet the confidentiality level of their network0
8.20.02Management interfaces separated from the user network0
8.21.01Flag and mitigate availability attacks at connection points with external or untrusted zones0
8.21.02Detection tools monitoring traffic to and from the trusted environment0
8.21.03Share newly identified threats within government0
8.21.04Encrypt wireless and external wired transmissions, risk-based, with NBV-advised tools where possible0
8.22.01Each segregated network group has its own security level0
8.24.01Cryptography policy with the required topics0
8.24.02Cryptographic controls in the asset inventory with use, ownership and currency0
8.24.04Cryptographic strength per NCSC and AIVD Resilience Unit recommendations0
8.24.05Backup certificates from an alternative supplier where continuity risk requires0
8.27.01Security by design and by default principles adopted and applied in all development0
8.29.01Structured, automated-where-possible acceptance testing with reported results0
8.30.01Internal development measures apply fully to outsourced development, plus outsourcing measures0
8.31.01No testing in production without the process owner's prior approval0
8.31.02Significant production changes always tested first unless the process owner approves otherwise0
8.32.01Change management covering administration, risk assessment with roll-back plan, and approval0
8.32.02Change management based on a generally accepted framework0
P1-1-3Reading guide, purpose and application0
P1-10Supervision0
P1-11Other applicable standards, laws and regulations0
P1-11.1aMandatory application of the BIO under the Cybersecurity Act and board responsibilities0
P1-11.1bBoard and staff training and notification of significant incidents0
P1-12.2Line management owns information systems and applies the measures0
P1-12.3CISO role0
P1-13Pass BIO obligations to suppliers in purchase requirements0
P1-14-15Information security principles and a balanced set of measures0
P1-16Determine additional measures by type of information0
P1-17Assess incident impact across the required impact areas0
P1-18Connection with other topics0
P1-4aEstablish an ISMS to NEN-EN-ISO/IEC 27001 that covers at least the critical processes and systems0
P1-4bSelect controls from NEN-EN-ISO/IEC 27002 plus the mandatory government measures0
P1-4cOperationalise the measures and prove their setup, existence and operation0
P1-5-6.1The management system, harmonized structure and context assessment0
P1-6.2Apply a risk management methodology with the required components0
P1-6.3-6.5Identify, analyse and treat risks, with government measures always mandatory0
P1-7Statement of Applicability with BIO measures and an exceptions annex0
P1-8Monitor and continually improve the management system0
P1-9Transparency and accountability on information security0
P2-introHow Part 2 works: government measures as the obligatory minimum for each control0

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What this page is

A control-level reference for Netherlands Baseline Information Security for Government 2 (BIO2), drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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