International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27); adopted as BS ISO/IEC 23837-1 and -2:2023 and, for part 1, GSO ISO/IEC 23837-1:2024 (Bahrain Decision No. 34 of 2025)

ISO/IEC 23837:2023

132 controls. 160 other frameworks in our corpus share controls with it. Here is all of it, and how much of it you are already doing.

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132 controls 160 frameworks share controls with it International (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27); adopted as BS ISO/IEC 23837-1 and -2:2023 and, for part 1, GSO ISO/IEC 23837-1:2024 (Bahrain Decision No. 34 of 2025) verified against its source document

Every control below is one this framework asks for. The right hand column counts how many other frameworks in our corpus carry the same control, which is the difference between doing this work once and doing it again for the next standard.

There is no implementation kit for this framework yet. The control list and the overlap above are free and complete.

What you already have

Frameworks whose controls overlap this one, most first. If you run any of them, the count is roughly what you have already evidenced.

Every control

CodeControlAlso in
23837-1.4.1QKD module structural analysis0
23837-1.4.2Classification of QKD protocols0
23837-1.4.3Security problems analysis0
23837-1.5.1Network component SFRs overview0
23837-1.5.2Cryptographic module requirements135
23837-1.5.3Network device testing requirements135
23837-1.6.1Quantum optical component SFRs0
23837-1.6.2Photon source security0
23837-1.6.3Quantum channel security0
23837-1.7.1Protocol implementation SFRs0
23837-1.7.2Key distillation process security0
23837-1.7.3Authentication and classical post-processing91
23837-2.1Evaluation activities for protocol implementation0
23837-2.2Evaluation activities for quantum optical components0
23837-2.3Evaluation activities for conventional network components0
23837-2.4Evaluation assurance levels0
23837-CHANChannel Integrity and Authentication0
23837-DEVDevelopment Process Assurance0
23837-ECError Correction Parameters0
23837-GUIGuidance Documentation0
23837-INCIncident Handling0
23837-KEYMGTOutput Key Management0
23837-LCMLife-cycle Management0
23837-MONOperational Monitoring0
23837-NETNetwork Integration0
23837-PAPrivacy Amplification0
23837-PHYPhysical Security of Modules0
23837-PROOFSecurity Proof Mapping0
23837-RNGRandom Number Generation0
23837-SARSecurity Assurance Requirements0
23837-SFRSecurity Functional Requirements0
23837-SIDESide-channel Resistance0
23837-SRCSource and Detector Characterisation0
23837-TESTTest Methods and Evaluation0
23837-TOETarget of Evaluation Definition0
23837-VULNVulnerability Analysis0
1-10Part 1, 10 Conformance statement0
1-10.2Part 1, 10.2 Conformance statement specific to the security problem definition0
1-10.3Part 1, 10.3 Conformance statement specific to the security functional requirements0
1-5Part 1, 5 Theoretical aspects of QKD protocols0
1-5.4Part 1, 5.4 Architecture: evaluation scope and merged parties0
1-6Part 1, 6 Implementation modules of QKD protocols0
1-6.2.2Part 1, 6.2.2 The quantum channel interface0
1-6.4Part 1, 6.4 TOE scope for QKD modules0
1-7Part 1, 7 Security problems analysis of QKD modules0
1-7.2Part 1, 7.2 Security assumptions0
1-7.3Part 1, 7.3 Assets analysis0
1-7.4.2Part 1, 7.4.2 Threats from network-based classical attacks0
1-7.5.2Part 1, 7.5.2 Threats exploiting optical source flaws0
1-7.5.3Part 1, 7.5.3 Threats exploiting optical detection vulnerabilities0
1-7.5.4Part 1, 7.5.4 Threats exploiting parameter adjustment vulnerabilities0
1-8Part 1, 8 Extended security functional components for QKD implementation0
1-9Part 1, 9 Security functional requirements for QKD modules0
1-9.2.1Part 1, 9.2.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation0
1-9.2.10Part 1, 9.2.10 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification0
1-9.2.11Part 1, 9.2.11 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities0
1-9.2.12Part 1, 9.2.12 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability0
1-9.2.13Part 1, 9.2.13 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes0
1-9.2.14Part 1, 9.2.14 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data0
1-9.2.15Part 1, 9.2.15 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions0
1-9.2.16Part 1, 9.2.16 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles0
1-9.2.17Part 1, 9.2.17 FPT_EMS.1/Convention Emanation of TSF and user data0
1-9.2.18Part 1, 9.2.18 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state0
1-9.2.19Part 1, 9.2.19 FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission0
1-9.2.2Part 1, 9.2.2 FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction0
1-9.2.20Part 1, 9.2.20 FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification0
1-9.2.21Part 1, 9.2.21 FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery0
1-9.2.22Part 1, 9.2.22 FPT_TST.1 TSF self-testing0
1-9.2.3Part 1, 9.2.3 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation0
1-9.2.4Part 1, 9.2.4 FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation0
1-9.2.5Part 1, 9.2.5 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control0
1-9.2.6Part 1, 9.2.6 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control0
1-9.2.7Part 1, 9.2.7 FDP_IRC.1 Information retention control0
1-9.2.8Part 1, 9.2.8 FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes0
1-9.2.9Part 1, 9.2.9 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action0
1-9.3.2Part 1, 9.3.2 FTP_QKD.1 QKD protocol and raw data generation0
1-9.3.3Part 1, 9.3.3 FTP_QKD.2 QKD post-processing0
1-9.4.2Part 1, 9.4.2 FPT_EMS.1/Quantum Emanation of TSF and user data0
1-9.4.3Part 1, 9.4.3 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack0
2-10Part 2, 10 Supplementary activities for the evaluation of SFRs on conventional network components0
2-10.2Part 2, 10.2 Evaluation activities for FCS-related SFRs0
2-10.3Part 2, 10.3 Evaluation activities for other SFRs0
2-11Part 2, 11 Supplementary activities for SARs0
2-11.2Part 2, 11.2 Supplementary activities for Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation0
2-11.3Part 2, 11.3 Supplementary activities for Class ASE: Security Target evaluation0
2-11.4.1Part 2, 11.4.1 Supplementary activities for ADV_ARC0
2-11.4.2Part 2, 11.4.2 Supplementary activities for ADV_FSP0
2-11.5.1Part 2, 11.5.1 Supplementary activities for AGD_OPE0
2-11.5.2Part 2, 11.5.2 Supplementary activities for AGD_PRE0
2-11.6.1Part 2, 11.6.1 Supplementary activities for ATE_FUN0
2-11.6.2Part 2, 11.6.2 Supplementary activities for ATE_IND0
2-11.7Part 2, 11.7 Supplementary activities for Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment0
2-12Part 2, 12 Conformance statement0
2-12.2Part 2, 12.2 Conformance statement specific to evaluation activities for SFRs0
2-12.3Part 2, 12.3 Conformance statement specific to EAs for SARs0
2-5Part 2, 5 Overview of the evaluation method for QKD modules0
2-5.3.1Part 2, 5.3.1 EAs for SFRs: content, inputs and calibration0
2-5.3.3Part 2, 5.3.3 EAs for optical components and parameter adjustment: criteria and statistics0
2-5.3.5Part 2, 5.3.5 Thresholds and input parameters0
2-5.4Part 2, 5.4 Overview of evaluation activities for SARs0
2-6Part 2, 6 EAs for the evaluation of FTP_QKD0
2-6.2Part 2, 6.2 EA to test quantum state transmission and sifting procedures0
2-6.3Part 2, 6.3 EA to test other post-processing procedures0
2-6.4Part 2, 6.4 EA to test parameter adjustment procedure(s)0
2-7Part 2, 7 EAs for evaluating quantum optical components in the transmitter module0
2-7.1Part 2, 7.1 General conditions for transmitter EAs0
2-7.10Part 2, 7.10 EA to test the robustness of the TX module against laser injection0
2-7.2Part 2, 7.2 EA to test the photon-number distribution of optical pulses0
2-7.3Part 2, 7.3 EA to test the mean photon number and stability of optical pulses0
2-7.4Part 2, 7.4 EA to test the independence of the intensities of optical pulses0
2-7.5Part 2, 7.5 EA to test the accuracy of state encoding0
2-7.6Part 2, 7.6 EA to test the indistinguishability of encoded states0
2-7.7Part 2, 7.7 EA to test the uniform distribution of the global phase of optical pulses0
2-7.8Part 2, 7.8 EA to test the degree of optical isolation of the TX module0
2-7.9Part 2, 7.9 EA to test the sensitivity of the injected light monitor in the TX module0
2-8Part 2, 8 EAs for the evaluation of quantum optical components in the receiver module0
2-8.10Part 2, 8.10 EA to test the detection limits of homodyne detectors in the RX module0
2-8.11Part 2, 8.11 EA to test the appropriateness of double-click event handling0
2-8.2Part 2, 8.2 EA to test the consistency of detection probability in the RX module0
2-8.3Part 2, 8.3 EA to test information leakage of back-flashes from the RX module0
2-8.4Part 2, 8.4 EA to test the degree of optical isolation of the RX module0
2-8.5Part 2, 8.5 EA to test the sensitivity of the injected light monitor in the RX module0
2-8.6Part 2, 8.6 EA to test the robustness of the RX module against bright light blinding0
2-8.7Part 2, 8.7 EA to test the appropriateness of dead time settings of SPDs0
2-8.8Part 2, 8.8 EA to test the temporal profile of the detection efficiency for SPDs0
2-8.9Part 2, 8.9 EA to test the robustness of the RX module against laser injection0
2-9Part 2, 9 EAs for the evaluation of parameter adjustment procedure(s)0
2-9.2Part 2, 9.2 EA to test the inducibility of detection probability mismatch0
2-9.3Part 2, 9.3 EA to test the correctness of shot noise alignment0
ANNEXESInformative annexes of both parts0
STANDARDISO/IEC 23837:2023: the two parts and their scope0
STATUSEdition status, modelling and relation to ETSI and certification0

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What this page is

A control-level reference for ISO/IEC 23837:2023, drawn from our framework corpus. Control codes and titles are references to the standard, not reproductions of it. The overlap counts and the auditor artefacts are our own work and are the part you will not find elsewhere.

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