ETSI-ISG-QKD-Components | Component characterisation (GS QKD 011, GS QKD 012) | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-Conformance | Implementation Conformance Statement against the ISG QKD series | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-KDAPI | Key delivery API (GS QKD 014) | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-NetIntegration | Network integration (GS QKD 015, GS QKD 018) | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-SecurityEval | Security proofs and evaluation (GS QKD 005, GS QKD 008, GS QKD 016) | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-Series | ETSI ISG QKD Group Specifications and Group Reports | 0 |
ETSI-ISG-QKD-UseCases | QKD use cases and requirements (GS QKD 002, GR QKD 003) | 0 |
004 | GS QKD 004 V2.1.1 (2020-08): application interface | 0 |
004.6.1A | 004.6.1A Key manager functions OPEN_CONNECT, GET_KEY and CLOSE | 0 |
004.6.1B | 004.6.1B Parameters: key stream identifier, QoS, metadata and status codes | 0 |
004.6.2 | 004.6.2 Key association sequences, timeouts and application discovery in a network | 0 |
005 | GS QKD 005 V1.1.1 (2010-12): security proofs | 0 |
005.4.1 | 005.4.1 Probabilistic security statement with a quoted security parameter | 0 |
005.4.3 | 005.4.3 Scientific proof plus implementation verification | 0 |
005.4.4 | 005.4.4 Stated assumptions on devices and on the adversary | 0 |
005.4.5 | 005.4.5 Physical model specified, verified and deviations quantified | 0 |
005.4.5.1 | 005.4.5.1 Source assumptions: phase randomisation, photon statistics, modes, isolation | 0 |
005.4.5.2 | 005.4.5.2 Detection unit assumptions: mode response, equal efficiencies, isolation | 0 |
005.4.7 | 005.4.7 Classical post-processing fully specified and consistent with the proof | 0 |
005.4.7.6 | 005.4.7.6 Authentication of the public channel and common protocol mistakes | 0 |
008 | GS QKD 008 V1.1.1 (2010-12): QKD module security specification | 0 |
008.4.10 | 008.4.10 Self-tests: pre-operational, conditional and critical functions | 0 |
008.4.11.1 | 008.4.11.1 Life-cycle assurance: configuration management, design, finite state model and development | 0 |
008.4.11.5 | 008.4.11.5 Vendor testing, secure delivery and guidance documents | 0 |
008.4.12 | 008.4.12 Mitigation of other attacks | 0 |
008.4.2 | 008.4.2 Module specification, cryptographic boundary and approved mode | 0 |
008.4.2.3 | 008.4.2.3 Multiple approved modes, degraded functionality and security strength | 0 |
008.4.3 | 008.4.3 Physical ports and logical interfaces | 0 |
008.4.4.1 | 008.4.4.1 Roles and two-factor identity-based operator authentication | 0 |
008.4.4.3 | 008.4.4.3 Services, bypass capability and external software loading | 0 |
008.4.5 | 008.4.5 Software security and integrity protection | 0 |
008.4.6 | 008.4.6 Operational environment and operating system controls | 0 |
008.4.7.1 | 008.4.7.1 Physical security: tamper evidence, response and opacity | 0 |
008.4.7.2 | 008.4.7.2 Embedded and standalone embodiments: enclosures, locks and tamper envelopes | 0 |
008.4.7.4 | 008.4.7.4 Environmental failure protection and testing | 0 |
008.4.8 | 008.4.8 Protection against non-invasive attacks | 0 |
008.4.9 | 008.4.9 SSP protection, random bit generation, generation and establishment | 0 |
008.4.9.4 | 008.4.9.4 SSP entry and output, storage and zeroisation | 0 |
008.B | 008.B Module Security Policy and documentation set | 0 |
011 | GS QKD 011 V1.1.1 (2016-05): component characterisation of optical components for QKD systems | 0 |
011.10 | 011.10 Stability of mean optical power | 0 |
011.11 | 011.11 Poissonian nature of emitted pulses | 0 |
011.12 | 011.12 Source emission temporal profile, temporal profile and timing jitter | 0 |
011.13 | 011.13 Source wavelength and spectral linewidth | 0 |
011.14 | 011.14 Detector gate repetition rate | 0 |
011.15 | 011.15 Dark count, after-pulse probability and detection efficiency | 0 |
011.16 | 011.16 Detection efficiency linearity factor | 0 |
011.17 | 011.17 Detection efficiency range due to polarisation | 0 |
011.18 | 011.18 Dead time, recovery, partial recovery and reset times | 0 |
011.19 | 011.19 Detector signal jitter and detection efficiency profile | 0 |
011.20 | 011.20 Spectral responsivity | 0 |
011.4.3 | 011.4.3 Weak laser pulse sources: encoding, indistinguishability and calibration | 0 |
011.5 | 011.5 Measurement conditions: SI traceability and reporting | 0 |
011.6 | 011.6 Clock frequency and its variation | 0 |
011.7 | 011.7 Output optical pulse repetition rate | 0 |
011.8 | 011.8 Mean photon number | 0 |
011.9 | 011.9 Mean source power | 0 |
012 | GS QKD 012 V1.1.1 (2019-02): device and communication channel parameters for QKD deployment | 0 |
012.4 | 012.4 Quantum, synchronisation and distillation channels | 0 |
012.5 | 012.5 Deployment architecture choice | 0 |
012.7.2 | 012.7.2 Network parameters the network operator communicates | 0 |
012.7.3 | 012.7.3 QKD parameters the QKD operator communicates | 0 |
014.COMMON | 014.COMMON Key delivery over mutually authenticated HTTPS | 0 |
014.GETKEY | 014.GETKEY Get key | 0 |
014.GETKEYIDS | 014.GETKEYIDS Get key with key IDs | 0 |
014.STATUS | 014.STATUS Get status | 0 |
015 | GS QKD 015 V2.1.1 (2022-04): control interface for software-defined QKD networks | 0 |
015.4.2 | 015.4.2 SD-QKD node requirements | 0 |
015.4.4 | 015.4.4 Node capabilities and QKD interface description | 0 |
015.4.5 | 015.4.5 Key association links tracked, isolated and kept inside the perimeter | 0 |
015.4.7 | 015.4.7 Notifications from node to controller | 0 |
015.5.2 | 015.5.2 Application registration with QoS in node and controller | 0 |
015.5.3 | 015.5.3 Dynamic creation of physical and virtual links | 0 |
015.6 | 015.6 Installation security, protocols and the normative YANG model | 0 |
016.EAL | 016.EAL Assurance level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 | 0 |
016.OBJ | 016.OBJ Security objectives for the TOE and its environment | 0 |
016.PKG.1 | 016.PKG.1 Package: trusted user interfaces with authentication | 0 |
016.PKG.2 | 016.PKG.2 Package: TOE self-protection | 0 |
016.PKG.3 | 016.PKG.3 Package: provisioning and re-personalisation after delivery | 0 |
016.PKG.4 | 016.PKG.4 Package: local authentication of users | 0 |
016.SFR.1 | 016.SFR.1 User identification and management | 0 |
016.SFR.2 | 016.SFR.2 Access control | 0 |
016.SFR.3 | 016.SFR.3 Audit data | 0 |
016.SFR.4 | 016.SFR.4 Reaching and preserving secure states | 0 |
016.SFR.5 | 016.SFR.5 Authenticated classical channel of the QKD link | 0 |
016.SFR.6 | 016.SFR.6 QKD key establishment (FCS_QKD.1) | 0 |
016.SFR.7 | 016.SFR.7 Management of the TSF | 0 |
016.SPD | 016.SPD Security problem definition: threats, policies and assumptions | 0 |
018 | GS QKD 018 V1.1.1 (2022-04): orchestration interface for software-defined QKD networks | 0 |
018.5.1 | 018.5.1 Topology discovery exposed to the orchestrator | 0 |
018.5.2 | 018.5.2 Network status and key resource inventory | 0 |
018.5.3 | 018.5.3 End-to-end service status | 0 |
018.5.4 | 018.5.4 Service provisioning with candidate paths and deployment | 0 |
018.5.5 | 018.5.5 Notifications and performance thresholds for the orchestrator | 0 |
018.7 | 018.7 Orchestration interface security and the normative YANG modules | 0 |
020 | GS QKD 020 V1.1.1 (2026-06): REST-based interoperable key management system API | 0 |
020.4.2A | 020.4.2A Asynchronous mode mandatory, synchronous mode optional | 0 |
020.4.2B | 020.4.2B Key association after errors: retain, retry or void | 0 |
020.4.3 | 020.4.3 Mutually authenticated HTTPS with TLS 1.3 | 0 |
020.4.4 | 020.4.4 Use only between co-located KMEs in a secure operational environment | 0 |
020.4.5 | 020.4.5 Vendor extensions: naming, mandatory and optional handling | 0 |
020.4.6 | 020.4.6 SAE identifiers unique, bounded and URI-safe | 0 |
020.5.2 | 020.5.2 Version discovery endpoint | 0 |
020.6.2 | 020.6.2 ext_keys: passing keys to another KME | 0 |
020.6.3 | 020.6.3 ext_keys/ack: acknowledging the status of keys | 0 |
020.6.4 | 020.6.4 ext_keys/void: discarding keys and guarding against mass voiding | 0 |
API | GS QKD 014 V1.1.1 (2019-02): REST-based key delivery API | 0 |
GR-DRAFTS | Use cases, Group Reports and drafts: GS QKD 002, GR QKD 003, GR QKD 007, GS QKD 010 draft, DGS/QKD-013, DGR/QKD-017, DGR/QKD-019, DGS/QKD-021 to 024 | 0 |
ISG | ETSI ISG QKD: the group, its deliverable series and its status | 0 |
NET | Network, key management and control interfaces (GS QKD 004, 015, 018, 020) | 0 |
PP | GS QKD 016 V2.1.1 (2024-01): Common Criteria Protection Profile for a pair of prepare-and-measure QKD modules | 0 |
SEC | Security proofs, module security, component characterisation and deployment parameters (GS QKD 005, 008, 011, 012) | 0 |